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 On Ecological Conceptualizations
of Perceptual Systems and Action
Systems
Rob Withagen
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Claire F. Michaels
University of Connecticut
Abstract. This article examines Gibson’s concept of perceptual system
and Reed’s concept of action system. After discussing several assumptions
underlying these concepts, the ontological status of these systems is
considered. It is argued that perceptual systems and action systems should
be conceptualized neither as parts of an animal’s body nor as softly
(temporarily) assembled devices; rather, they are best understood as
animals’ abilities to achieve functional relationships, that is, as disposi-
tional properties. This conceptualization entails that these systems are
relatively permanent properties of the animal that are causally supported
by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Further, it entails that it
is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and action
systems.
Key Words: action, action system, affordances, direct perception, disposi-
tion, information, perception, perceptual system, softly assembled device
One of the major contributions of James Gibson, the founder of the
ecological approach to perception, was his conceptualization of perceptual
systems. In his book The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Gibson
(1966) asserted that perceptual systems should be defined in terms of the
functions they perform, that is, the detection of perceptual information. His
view contrasted with the then-accepted view in two important respects. First,
Gibson asserted that the detection of information is an active process.
Animals are not passively receiving impoverished stimulus information,
which would require inferential processing (as was and is held by many
psychologists). Instead, they are actively moving and exploring, thereby
creating ambient arrays that specify meaningful properties of their environ-
ments. Second, Gibson rejected the claim that perceptual systems are
channels of sensation identified by a particular kind of receptor or sense
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organ. In the detection of information, he argued, many body parts can be
involved:
We are told that vision depends on the eye, which is connected to the brain.
I shall suggest that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body
supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a
complete visual system. (Gibson, 1979, p. 1)
Moreover, the anatomical structures involved in the detection of an informa-
tional variable can vary. According to Gibson, an animal, at least in some
cases, is capable of detecting the same informational variable in several
ways involving different anatomical structures. Hence, perception is not
specific to anatomical structures but is, Gibson (1966, 1979) asserted, a
function of perceptual information.
Inspired by Gibson’s (1966, 1979) ecological psychology and the work of
the Russian action theorists, who are regarded as having introduced the
concept of functional system (e.g. Bernstein, 1967; Luria, 1973), Reed
(1982a, 1988b, 1996) developed the concept of action systems as an
analogue to Gibson’s concept of perceptual systems. Adopting an evolution-
ary point of view, Reed (1982a, 1985) argued that behavior is a mode of
resource usage—behavior is an ecological phenomenon.1 Reed’s conceptu-
alization differed from the usual understanding of behavior. Ever since the
‘mechanization of the worldview’ (Dijksterhuis, 1950), behavior has been
generally regarded as a mechanical response to a stimulus—behavior is
specific to the mechanism generating it (see, e.g. Gallistel, 1980). Reed
(1982a, 1985, 1988b, 1996) opposed this view; he asserted that behavior is
not intrinsically mechanical, but intrinsically functional. Behavior, even a
reflex, constitutes a mode by which a functional relationship with the
environment is established:
Far from being indifferent to changes in function, movements and postures
(and their underlying mechanisms) are often precisely attuned to the
animal’s ‘motor problem’. Thus I proposed the hypothesis that behaviors
are functionally specific (i.e. supported by resources specific to behavior,
by affordances) as a counter to the traditional hypothesis that behaviors are
functionally indifferent (or mechanically specific, which comes to the same
thing). (Reed, 1985, pp. 362–363)
By arguing that action, like perception, is specific not to mechanism but to
function, Reed followed Gibson. The concept of action system was intro-
duced to explain how functional relationships with the environment are
established. Reed (1982a, 1996) argued that in the course of evolution,
selection pressures gave rise to different action systems, enabling animals to
establish new functional relationships with their environments.
Gibson’s concept of perceptual systems and Reed’s concept of action
systems play considerable roles in the ecological approach to perception and
action. The concepts are referred to often, and are used as a theoretical
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framework for questions regarding perception and action (e.g. Bertenthal &
Bai, 1989; Goldfield, 1989, 1995; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Davids,
1999; Pick, 1989; Rochat, 1989). However, despite several attempts to
elaborate the ecological concepts of perceptual systems and action systems
(e.g. Bingham, 1988; Goldfield, 1995; Kugler & Turvey, 1987), some
researchers have found the concepts opaque. Looren de Jong (1992), for
instance, stated that, ‘Reed’s “action systems” approach . . . has little
empirical backing and remains rather vague and programmatic’ (p. 22).
Similarly, the ecological psychologists Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) found
Gibson’s concept of perceptual systems inadequate.
Any vagueness in Reed’s action-systems approach may be partly due to
the lack of a clear statement of the ontological status of action systems. As
has been argued over the last decade, ecological psychology may not have
its ‘ontological house in order’ (Chemero, 2002; see also Turvey, 1992).
Recent discussions on ontology among proponents of the ecological ap-
proach have been focused primarily on the nature of affordances, a concept
introduced by Gibson (1966, 1979) to refer to the action possibilities that the
environment offers the animal (see, e.g. Chemero, 2003; Sanders, 1997;
Stoffregen, 2003; Turvey, 1992). Unfortunately, the nature of perceptual
systems and action systems, ecological concepts that are allied to the
concept of affordance, has received scant attention.2 However, theoretical
work addressing the ontology of these systems is, we believe, required. Reed
(1982a, 1996) and to a lesser extent Gibson (1966) were not very explicit
about the nature of these systems. They were clear in suggesting that these
systems should not be understood as parts of the body, but they did not
provide a consistent, unequivocal view of how else to conceive of them.
The main purpose of this article is to consider the ontology of perceptual
systems and of action systems.3 We start our analysis by laying out Gibson’s
(1966, 1979) and Reed’s (1982a, 1996) ideas of perception and action.
These ideas form the fundamental assumptions underlying these authors’
concepts of perceptual and action systems. Then, we turn attention to the
nature of these systems as functional systems. Such a generic term can be
used because the concepts are, we argue, based on the same assumptions and
are of the same nature. After exploring and dismissing several possibilities
regarding the ontological status of functional systems, we suggest that they
are best understood as the animal’s powers to achieve functional relation-
ships. An animal with a functional system is an animal with the capacity to
establish a certain functional relation.
The Assumptions Underlying Gibson’s and Reed’s Concepts
Gibson’s (1966) concept of perceptual system and Reed’s (1982a, 1996)
concept of action system differed in important respects from the more
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traditional view. Both Gibson and Reed argued against psychologies based
on mechanistic metaphors. Below we briefly discuss four assumptions
underlying their conceptualizations, and thereby sketch in bold strokes the
ecological approach to perception and action.
Affordances: A Meaningful Environment
Both Gibson (1966, 1979) and Reed (1982a, 1996) argued that animals live
in a meaningful environment. Meaning is ‘out there’ in the environment and
the animal can perceive it. This claim was radical. Ever since the scientific
revolution in the 17th century, philosophers and later psychologists have
generally regarded the world as meaningless. It consists merely of matter
and motion. There is no meaning or value ‘out there’. Hence, the meaningful
world as one experiences it is thought to be a product of the mind. In the
heyday of the cognitive revolution this view was dominant. Many percep-
tionists took as their general goal explaining how an experienced meaningful
world is constructed out of meaningless stimuli impinging on the sense
organs. Neisser (1967) spoke for many when he argued that, ‘Visual
cognition . . . deals with the processes by which a perceived, remembered,
and thought-about world is brought into being from as unpromising a
beginning as the retinal patterns’ (p. 4).
As noted above, Gibson (1966, 1979) argued that the environment of an
animal is in and of itself meaningful, and a key concept was that of
affordances. Affordances are the action possibilities the environment offers
the animal. As Gibson (1979) put it: ‘The affordances of the environment
are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or
for ill’ (p. 127). The ground surface is walk-on-able, the chairs are sit-on-
able, the cup on one’s desk is graspable, and so on. The affordances, Gibson
(1966, 1979) asserted, constitute the animal’s environment and are the
primary objects of experience.
Note that an environment described in terms of affordances is a mean-
ingful environment. ‘The meaning or value of a thing consists of what it
affords’ (Gibson, 1982, p. 407). Further, it is an environment described in
animal-relative terms. To determine the affordances in an animal’s environ-
ment, one must measure environmental properties relative to the animal’s
abilities. As an example, to determine whether a cup is graspable for some
person, its size must be measured relative to the size of that person’s hand.
Being animal-relative, the environment is unique to each animal. A cup
that is graspable for an adult may not afford grasping for a baby. The
affordances of the animal’s environment arise along with the animal’s
abilities—the existence of an affordance implies a fit between animal and
environment. Although affordances exist by virtue of the animal’s abilities,
they are objective in the sense that their existence is independent of being
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perceived, or, more generally, their existence is independent of mind (see,
e.g. Michaels, 2003).
Information as Specification
Whereas Gibson’s theorizing on affordances was primarily concerned with
how they are perceived, Reed’s theorizing primarily addressed how afford-
ances are utilized, that is, action. In part this difference in emphasis is due to
the fact that Gibson’s advocacy of an information-based theory of perception
predated his development of the affordance concept. The information-based
or direct-perception theory took aim at the assumption in traditional theories
that the senses passively receive impoverished stimuli from the environment.
Impoverished input entails the earlier-described process of inferring or
constructing a meaningful percept. Gibson’s argument was that the informa-
tion available to the animal is rich, not impoverished. By actively moving,
the animal creates patterns in the ambient flow that specify significant
properties of the environment. This specification—the one-to-one relation
between information and to-be-perceived properties—also applies to action
possibilities. And such specifying patterns, Gibson insisted, can be picked
up. Because there is specifying information available that informs the
animal, the enrichment of impoverished stimuli is not needed. Perceiving an
affordance is the result of the detection of information that is specific to it.
This theory of direct perception was a significant departure within the
study of perception. First, it emphasized that perception is an activity. In
order to perceive, an animal actively explores and thereby creates and
detects meaningful patterns in the ambient arrays. Second, Gibson’s (1966,
1979) direct perception theory has yielded a search for the informational
variables that animals detect. In recent decades, ecological psychologists
have discovered several informational variables that animals appear to
exploit as they regulate their encounters with the environment. Patterns in
the ambient arrays have been discovered that inform animals about what
they can do in their environment and how they can do it (e.g. Michaels,
Zeinstra, & Oudejans, 2001; Savelsbergh, Whiting, & Bootsma, 1991;
Warren, 1988). Thereby, ecological psychology set an important precedent
for the now popular idea that an explanation for perception and action
should not be sought solely within the animal, but requires an examination
of the interplay of environmental and organismal factors (see also Clark,
1997). As Gibson (1979) put it, ‘Locomotion and manipulation are con-
trolled not by the brain, but by information. Control lies in the animal–
environment system’ (p. 225).
Perception and Action as Functional Relations
Emphasizing the environment in their theorizing, Gibson (1979) and Reed
(1982a, 1996) conceptualized perception and action in a way that differed
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from the then-accepted view, namely as processes of establishing functional
relationships with the environment. Although functional considerations had
been advocated by several thinkers in the past (e.g. Holt, 1914; James,
1890/1950; Jennings, 1906, 1908), this conceptualization has not been
dominant in psychology. Instead, and as noted earlier, psychology has been
dominated by the mechanistic worldview, which had done away with the
idea of final cause, central to the Aristotelian worldview. All is matter in
motion, and the only explanation that can be called on is in terms of causes
and effects.
The mechanistic worldview led to the construction of mechanical models
that simulated physiological functions. These mechanical models, in turn,
inspired many psychologists. Animals, humans included, were often con-
ceived of as (complex) machines, and their activity was understood in
mechanistic terms. The influence of the mechanistic metaphor on the
conceptualization of perception and action is far-reaching. Metaphors are not
ontologically neutral; instead they influence the conceptualization of the
phenomena to be explained and the concepts that are brought to bear to
explain them (e.g. Vroon & Draaisma, 1985). Inspired by mechanistic
metaphors, researchers generally conceived of animals’ actions as mechan-
ical responses: action is specific to the mechanism generating it and can be
accurately described independent of the environment. Roughly speaking,
action was conceived of as a change in the position of the limbs (Tamboer,
1995). Being mechanical responses, actions, so it was assumed, are elicited
by stimuli, either from inside the system or from the environment. Over the
years this idea was elaborated and resulted in stimulus–response psychology,
arguably one of the most powerful frameworks in psychology ever since.
The stimulus–response conceptualization of animal activity that was dom-
inant at the beginning of the 20th century was still clearly rooted in a
mechanistic view of animals. For instance, in 1927, Pavlov wrote, ‘a
stimulus appears to be connected with a given response as cause with effect’
(p. 10). The idea that animal behavior can be captured in stimuli and
responses was, of course, central to the behaviorists. But when in the 1960s
and 1970s cognitive psychology was in its ascendancy, animal behavior was
still couched in terms of stimuli and responses (see, e.g. Reed, 1997).
Cognitivists asserted only that mental processes on the input are required to
carry it into a response. As to perception, Fodor (1968), for instance, argued
that the aim of the cognitive approach is to explain ‘the disparity between
the input and the percept’ (p. 86), that is, how the animal gets from the
stimuli to the meaningful percept.
Although the apparent wide applicability of this stimulus–response
conceptualization of animals’ activity might be appealing, this conceptual-
ization, Reed (1982a, 1996) asserted, does not capture the essential charac-
teristic of animal life. In fact, the mechanistic metaphor is misleading in
several ways. First, it implies that animals are passive receivers of stimuli;
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machines do not act unless put into action. This is not the case for animals;
animals are ceaselessly active, exploring the environment and acting in it.
Second, the mechanistic metaphor underrates the mutual influence of
the animal and its environment. The mutual influence of a machine with
its environment is far more limited and of a different sort than that of
animal and environment. Third, and most important for present purposes,
the mechanistic metaphor yields a misleading view of action. An action
is arguably more than a mechanical response elicited by a physical stimulus;
an action is goal-directed—it is performed for the sake of its result.
Early illustrations of the goal-directedness of actions can be found in
Jennings’s (1906) texts on the behavior of lower organisms, which inspired
Reed (1996):
The organism moves and reacts in ways that are advantageous to it. If it
gets into hot water, it takes measures to get out again, and the same is true
if it gets into excessively cold water. If it enters an injurious chemical
solution, it at once changes its behavior and escapes. . . . In innumerable
details it does those things that are good for it. It is plain that behavior
depends largely on the needs of the organism, and is of such a nature as to
satisfy these needs. (Jennings, 1906, pp. 338–339)
According to Jennings, actions are regulatory: action is a mode by which an
animal establishes a particular relationship with its environment. By con-
ceiving of action as the animal’s adjustment of its relation to its environment
so as to establish the intended relation, the goal-directedness of behavior is
captured. This characteristic is not captured in a stimulus–response con-
ceptualization of behavior. The latter portrays action not as a means to
achieve a goal, but as a mechanical response that has no intrinsic function in
and of itself. Only when the action occurs in a biological context in which its
consequences happen to be beneficial for the animal is the action considered
functional (see Hinde, 1975, for this conceptualization of function). Thus, in
the mechanistic framework, behavior is intrinsically mechanical, and ex-
trinsically functional (see Reed, 1985). Although movements as mechanical
responses triggered by stimuli do occur in certain laboratory settings, an
account of animal behavior, Reed (1982a, 1985, 1988b, 1996) asserted,
cannot be based on the stimulus–response framework. Animals are cease-
lessly active, establishing relations between themselves and their environ-
ments satisfying their needs and wants. Reed argued that an account of
animal behavior should capture this goal-directedness; it should emphasize
that actions are performed to establish relations with the environment; it
should conceptualize actions as such, and aim at an account of how the
relations between the animal and its environment are established.
As is the case in acting, perceiving can also be said to establish a
functional relation to the environment, although this might not appear
straightforward. In the history of psychology, a percept has often been
considered as a mental state, more or less isolated from the world. A slightly
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more elaborate version of the indirect perception theory described earlier is
as follows: A stimulus is imposed on a receptor (or feature detector, say) and
gives rise to a sensation, an awareness of the state of the receptor (or
detector). Only this sensation is directly apprehended. Because the sensation
is ambiguous with respect to the environmental property that induced it, the
animal must infer the causes of the sensation to gain knowledge about the
environment. The inferences result in a representation of the world, and it is
this representation to which perception corresponds. Hence, perception
resides in the head and is more or less detached from the environment.
Although in somewhat different forms, this idea dominated perception
theories from Descartes to Mu¨ller and Helmholtz, and is the basic assump-
tion in many modern cognitive theories of perception (see, e.g. Meijering,
1989; Reed, 1982b).
However, there are alternative approaches to perception. In the realist
tradition, perception is conceived as an ecological phenomenon—perception
resides in the animal–environment system. The essence of this approach is
that the object of perception is not a mental construct based on sensations;
the object of perception is the environment. What animals perceive are the
environmental objects and events; the object of perception is ‘out there’. In
this approach, perception is no longer conceptualized as a mental state;
rather, it is an epistemic relationship between the animal and an environ-
mental property—perceiving is a being in contact with the environment. The
idea of perception as epistemic contact can be traced to Aristotle (see
Lombardo, 1987), is central to the work of the American functionalist Holt
(1914), and is the foundation of Gibson’s (1966, 1979) ecological approach
to perception (see Heft, 2001). ‘Perceiving is an achievement of the
individual, not an appearance in the theatre of his consciousness. It is a
keeping-in-touch with the world, an experiencing of things rather than a
having of experiences’ (Gibson, 1979, p. 239).4
Multiple Realizability of Functional Relationships
The ecological concepts of perceptual and action systems are suggested to
explain how animals establish functional relations with their environments.
Reed (1982a, 1996) argued that evolving action systems enabled the animal
to adjust its relations to its environment. And Gibson’s (1996, 1979) concept
of perceptual systems accounts for how animals detect specifying informa-
tion and thereby stay in epistemic contact with the affordances.
However, an animal can, in general, establish the same functional
relationship with its environment through several means. As has long been
recognized, an animal can generally reach the same motor outcome in
multiple ways involving different anatomical structures, a phenomenon
referred to as motor equivalence (e.g. Hebb, 1949; Lashley, 1930). For
instance, a human being can change his or her location in the environment
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by walking, crawling, sidestepping, and so on. The ability to reach the same
end through different means is also omnipresent in lower organisms and,
thus, does not depend on having a brain (see, e.g. Darwin, 1881). According
to Reed (1982a, 1985, 1996), a mechanistic conceptualization of action is
incapable of capturing this characteristic of behavior. ‘[The] very un-
mechanistic interchangeability of means to achieve ends of action’ cannot
be understood by ‘standard conceptions of psychological explanation . . .
based as they are on mechanistic metaphors’ (Reed, 1996, p. 12). In his
The Principles of Psychology, James (1890/1950) also pointed out the
inappropriateness of the mechanistic view to account for animals’ activity.
He referred to Pflu¨ger’s experiments on the wiping behavior of frogs. In
these experiments, frogs were decapitated and acid was put on their backs.
The spinal frog wiped the acid off with one of its hind legs. When this
hind leg is amputated and the acid is again put on the frog’s back, the
stump moves for some time, after which the acid is wiped off with the
contralateral foot.5 According to James, this behavior cannot be understood
in a mechanistic framework. If wiping the acid off with the hind leg were
just a mechanical response to the stimulus, then there is no reason to
assume that the frog’s contralateral foot will remove the acid when the first
leg is amputated. If, on the other hand, action is intrinsically functional and
the intended end-state can be reached in multiple ways, variation in the
way the goal is reached is the rule.
In perception, the multiple realizability of function has been hypothesized
at least at two levels. First, it has been suggested that the same environ-
mental property can be perceived by the detection of different informational
variables available in a particular sensory array. That is, the same percep-
tual modality might establish an epistemic relation with an environmental
property by detecting different informational variables. This theory is known
as directed perception (see Cutting, 1986). Second, the same informational
variables might be shown to be detected by different anatomical structures.
A particular animal can, at least in some cases, detect the same informational
variable in multiple ways involving different anatomical substrates. As an
example, consider the optical acceleration of a fly ball, which informs the
fielder about whether the ball will land in front of, at, or behind his initial
position (Chapman, 1968). This information can, in principle, be detected by
several means involving different anatomical structures: one might use the
retinal flow created by the ball when the eyes fixate a stationary point; one
might track the ball with the eyes and use the acceleration via the eye
muscles; or one might lock head movements to the ball and use the angular
velocity of the head as carried by the vestibular organs (Oudejans et al.,
1999). Bongers and Michaels (2004) showed that even when one restricts
the movement of the eyes, the head, or both, perceivers are capable of
reporting whether the ball will land in front or behind their position,
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suggesting that they are indeed able to detect the optical information by any
of several means.
As both Gibson (1966) and Reed (1982a, 1985) stressed, the multiple
realizability of functional relations disproves the doctrine that perception and
action are specific to neural mechanisms. That doctrine—that there is one-to-
one mapping of psychological functions onto neural substrates—is as old as
anatomy and physiology and can be found in a number of neuropsycho-
logical theories (see, e.g. Young, 1970). Two well-known examples are the
Bell–Magendie law and the ‘doctrine of specific nerve energies’, each of
which had a major influence on the history of psychology (e.g. Reed,
1982b). The Bell–Magendie law holds that sensory and motor functions are
carried on in different sets of nerves. The ‘doctrine of specific nerve
energies’ states that sensations are specific to nerves.
At the time that Gibson and Reed developed their concepts of perceptual
and action systems, the doctrine of the anatomical specificity of psycho-
logical functions was widely accepted. Hence, in their texts both Gibson and
Reed paid considerable attention to debunking this doctrine, and thereby
making room for their own ideas of perception, action, and functional
systems. Especially Reed’s texts (1982a, 1982b, 1985, 1986, 1988b, 1996)
are laced with arguments against the idea that action is specific to anatomical
substrates. The gists of the arguments by Reed and Gibson are basically the
same: The same piece of anatomy can have different functions, and the same
function can be realized by different pieces of anatomy. In his book on the
perceptual systems, Gibson (1966) stated:
The same incoming nerve fiber makes a different contribution to the pickup
of information from one moment to the next. The pattern of the excited
receptors is of no account; what counts is the external pattern that is
temporarily occupied by excited receptors as the eyes roam over the world,
or as the skin moves over an object. The individual sensory units have to
function vicariously, to borrow a term from Lashley, a neuropsychologist.
(pp. 4–5)
And at the beginning of his paper ‘An Outline of a Theory of Action
Systems’, Reed (1982a), following Gibson (1966), argued that a physiologist
can make a clear distinction between afferent and efferent neurons, but that
it is a mistake to call the former sensory and the latter motor. There is no
one-to-one mapping from psychological functions onto anatomical struc-
tures; afferent neurons can serve a motor function, and efferent neurons can
perform sensory functions.6
The Nature of Functional Systems
Now that we have laid out the key ideas underlying Gibson’s concept of
perceptual systems and Reed’s concept of action systems, we can address
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the ontological status of these systems. We discuss several possibilities.
First, we consider, given the above discussion, whether there are ways a
functional system can be understood as a piece of anatomy, that is, as a part
of an animal’s body. Second, we discuss the possibility that functional
systems should be understood as softly assembled devices, as several
ecological psychologists seem to suggest (see, e.g. Pagano, Grutzmacher, &
Jenkins, 2001). We ultimately reject both possibilities, and put forward the
view that functional systems are best understood as the animals’ powers to
achieve functional relations with their environments.
Is a Functional System a Piece of Anatomy?
In an everyday conceptualization of functional systems, one is inclined to
conceive a functional system as a piece of anatomy. However, given the
earlier arguments that there is no anatomical specificity in performing a
function on different occasions, it seems not possible to identify a functional
system with a piece of anatomy. Consider human locomotion again. Is there
a part of the human body that is responsible for the function of locomotion
and can be called the locomotor system? As we remarked earlier, the means
of locomotion and, thus, the anatomical structures that can be involved are
quite diverse. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as the part of the
human body that is responsible for achieving the function. This renders it
impossible to identify a locomotor system with a piece of anatomy. One can
point to a human’s eyes, arms and legs, but is not possible to point to a
human’s locomotor system. Hence, it seems that functional systems have a
different ontological status than anatomical substrates.
Is a Functional System a Softly Assembled Device?
Several ecological psychologists have discussed the interchangeability of the
parts achieving a function in terms of the concept of task-specific device,
also referred to as softly assembled device (e.g. Bingham, 1988; Kugler &
Turvey, 1987; Pagano et al., 2001). The idea is that the anatomical structures
of the body have particular dynamic properties. By assembling these
properties, a temporary device is formed that can execute the task at hand.
The devices are described as soft because functionally equivalent devices
can be assembled over different anatomical structures, and the same anatom-
ical structure can be involved in functionally different systems. Thereby, the
concept of softly assembled device captures the multiple realizability of
functions that both Gibson (1966) and Reed (1982a) emphasized.
A number of ecological psychologists have suggested that perceptual and
action systems should be conceived of as softly assembled devices (see, e.g.
Pagano et al., 2001). But are functional systems themselves best thought of
as such devices? Although the concept of task-specific device is an illum-
inating one that is of help in understanding how a relatively simple,
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low-dimensional system can be assembled from a myriad of diverse compo-
nents, there is, we think, a problem with conceiving of functional systems as
such devices: by definition, softly assembled devices are temporary devices.
‘A soft device is temporarily organized from general dynamic properties—
not specific anatomical components—to fit current task constraints’ (Pagano
et al., 2001, p. 216). Hence, the task-specific device exists only when the
dynamic properties are assembled in a particular way so that a certain task
can be performed. That is, by assembling dynamic properties, an animal
transforms into a task-specific device. Kugler and Turvey (1987) illustrated
this idea quite nicely by asking ‘how a person—a very complex dynamical
system composed of functionally rich components and very many degrees of
freedom—can make of himself or herself a pendular clock—a very simple,
dynamical system with few degrees of freedom?’ (p. 406).
Although this picture of transforming into task-specific devices might be
appealing, we are inclined to think of functional systems as being of a more
permanent nature. Consider, again, the locomotor system. To our minds it
makes sense to attribute a locomotor system to, say, a dog, irrespective of
the activity the dog is involved in. Any temporary organization of the dog’s
anatomical parts is of no account. A dog has a locomotor system also when
it is asleep. Thus, an animal with a locomotor system is not an animal with
a temporary assemblage of anatomical structures. Rather, the concept of
locomotor system refers to a power of the animal, namely the capacity (or
disposition) to change its location in the environment. An animal with a
locomotor system is an animal with the power to change its location in the
environment, and an animal without such a system lacks this power. To our
minds, the ecological conceptualizations of perceptual systems and action
systems refer to the animals’ powers to establish functional relations with
their environments. This means that they refer to dispositional properties, a
hypothesis we explore in the next section.
Functional Systems as Dispositions
In psychology, the concept of disposition is probably best known through
the work of the philosopher Gilbert Ryle—the concept played a key role in
his philosophy of mind. Trying to circumvent the problems of Cartesian
dualism, Ryle (1949) asserted that psychological concepts such as belief,
desire, knowledge, and the like, do not refer to immaterial causes and effects
in a mental theater; rather, they refer to dispositions. ‘A disposition is an
ability, tendency, liability or proneness to act or react, or fail to act or react,
in a certain way in certain circumstances’ (Lyons, 1980, p. 46). A stock
example of a disposition in the physical world is brittleness. To say that
glass is brittle is to say that it will break under certain circumstances. It is
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important to emphasize that dispositions are not things or occurrences. A
dispositional concept does not refer to a structural entity; neither does it refer
to an occurrence like breaking or dissolving. Instead, a dispositional concept
refers to what an animal or object can or will do in certain circumstances—it
refers to a potentiality.
Ryle (1949) asserted that many psychological concepts refer to disposi-
tions of animals and humans. For instance, to say that someone is intelligent
is not to say that he or she is in a kind of immaterial mental state; rather, it
is to say that he or she is capable of solving difficult problems. The concept
of intelligence refers to a power of a person. To our minds, the concept of
functional system refers to a dispositional property in like fashion. This
position has several implications.
First, if functional systems are conceived of as powers, then listing the
animal’s perceptual systems and action systems is not listing pieces of
anatomy, each of which has a particular function. Rather, listing the
functional systems is describing the perceptual and behavior repertoire of
the animal. It is describing the functional relations to the environment
that the animal is capable of establishing.7
Second, conceived of as capabilities, functional systems are causally
supported by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Tissue provides
the structural basis for an animal to have the power to establish a functional
relation with its environment. Hence, functional systems are not occult
properties of the animal; one does not appeal to vitalism when explaining a
phenomenon by referring to a functional system. Our conceptualization of
functional system is consonant with materialism, an ontological statement to
which many ecological psychologists subscribe (e.g. Turvey, 1992). How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that a functional system is not identical to
the tissue that supports it. A power to establish a functional relation with the
environment is not something one can point to.
Third, if perceptual systems and action systems are conceived of as
dispositional properties, perceiving and acting can be understood as their
manifestations. That is, in the act of perceiving, a perceptual system mani-
fests itself. And in the performance of an action, the action system manifests
itself. The manifestation of a perceptual system or action system requires a
certain assemblage of dynamic properties. For instance, to act, the ‘dynam-
ical properties of muscles and bones, along with tendons, joints, skin, and
other surrounding tissues, are temporarily assembled to produce determin-
istic dynamics for the performance of a particular task’ (Pagano et al., 2001,
p. 215). And as stressed earlier, the anatomical structures involved in the
executing of a task can vary (e.g. Bingham, 1988; Gibson, 1966; Kugler &
Turvey, 1987; Reed, 1982a, 1988b, 1996). Thus, a functional system can
manifest itself in different ways, through different assemblages of anatom-
ical substrates.
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Fourth, although the manifestation of a functional system is in general
temporary, the functional system in and of itself is a relatively permanent
property of the animal. Its existence does not depend on whether or not it is
manifested. As Harre´ (1970) put it, ‘Things and materials have powers even
when they are not exercising them, and that is a current fact about them, a
way in which they are currently differentiated from other things and
materials which lack these powers’ (pp. 84–85).
Fifth, the view that perceptual systems and action systems are dispositions
implies that it is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and
action system, respectively. Dispositions are causally impotent in the sense
that they cannot do anything. Brittleness cannot break. The thing that acts is
the thing that possesses the disposition, say, the glass that is brittle. This
means that if functional systems are conceived of as powers of the animal, it
is the animal, as opposed to its functional systems, that perceives and acts.
This implication fits with an idea forwarded by Bennett and Hacker (2003).
In their conceptual analyses of recent neuroscience, they accuse many
neuroscientists of making the ‘mereological fallacy’—the fallacy of ascrib-
ing psychological attributes to the brain or parts thereof, whereas such
attributes can only be sensibly ascribed to the animal as a whole. As an
example, it makes no sense to say that the brain is in love, for the predicate
being in love can only be reasonably attributed to the human as a whole.
‘Psychological predicates are predicates that apply essentially to the whole
living animal, not to its parts’ (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 72). Our
conceptualization of the ecological concepts of perceptual systems and
action systems yields an attribution of the psychological predicates perceiv-
ing and acting that is consonant with this dictum—it is the whole living
animal that perceives and acts.
Conclusion
In this article, Gibson’s (1966) concept of perceptual systems and Reed’s
(1982a) concept of action systems were examined. These concepts were
claimed to rest upon the conceptualization of perceiving and acting as
establishing functional relations with the environment. We emphasized that
functional relations are, in general, multiply realizable: an animal is usually
capable of establishing the same relation in multiple ways involving differ-
ent anatomical structures. Therefore, an animal’s functional system could
not be identified with a part of its body. We suggested that functional
systems are best thought of as powers to establish functional relationships,
that is, as dispositional properties. In this conceptualization, functional
systems are relatively permanent properties of the animal that are supported
by anatomical structures, without being identical to them.
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Notes
1. It is important to note that other ecological psychologists have also sought an
elaboration of Gibson’s program to deal with the problem of action (e.g. Kadar &
Shaw, 2000; Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982; Turvey, 1992), but it was Reed who
explicitly developed the concept of action system. Thus, it is Reed’s work that
serves as our departure point.
2. Attention has also been given to the ontological status of effectivity, a concept
not unrelated to action systems. Just as an affordance is a functional construal of
the environment taken with reference to an animal, effectivity is a functional
construal of the animal taken with respect to the enviroment. However, its
ontological status is unclear. Turvey (1992) describes both affordances and
effectivities as dispositions, whereas others (e.g. Kadar & Shaw, 2000) define
effectivities not as dispositions but as the actualizers of affordances.
3. The important questions of how these two systems relate to each other, and how,
more generally, perception and action are related, are not addressed.
4. There is some debate about what Gibson (1966, 1979) meant when he argued that
perception is direct. It has even been argued that Gibson himself used his concept
of direct perception in several ways (e.g. Costall, 1989). To our reading, however,
the quintessence of Gibson’s direct perception theory is the claim that the object
of perception is the environment (cf. Heft, 2001; Mace, 2003).
5. See Reed (1986) and Meijer (1988) for a more detailed description of these
experiments, their origin, and the discussions they resulted in.
6. For the vicarious functions of neurons see, for instance, Edelman (1987).
7. In an unpublished manuscript written in the early stages of his career, Gibson
(1926), too, appears to conceive of action systems as referring to the capabilities
of animals: ‘[E]very species of the lower organisms has a characteristic action
system—that is, every animal possesses a specific repertory of movements—a
certain number of reactions which it can make, these reactions forming a
coordinated system’ (in Reed, 1988a, p. 69).
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